3: Anonymous U-4 (no date) 1920 RH1 Caucasia RH1

from the District Courts' decisions could be taken to the Supreme Court at Tiflis, and from that to Petersburg. The Courts were accessible and cheap, and there was no discrimination between Russian subjects and foreigners in legal proceedings; but judgements given in Russian Courts had no effect in England, nor decisions obtained in England in Russia.

The Cossack communities are divided into *stanitzas* or villages, each *stanitza* having an elected assembly of 30 members; in populous *stanitzas* one man is elected from every ten households. These assemblies have wider powers than the usual *mir* or commune, viz. division of land, assessment of taxes, regulation of schools, grain stores, cultivation, &c., and the election of elders (*ataman*) and judges.

When the Revolution occurred in 1917, the Viceroy was recalled, and the various nationalities in the Caucasus arranged representative National Assemblies; but, as chaos in the Empire increased, relations were broken off with the Central Government. A separate Transcaucasian Republic was formed, in the Government of which Armenians, Tatars, and Georgians were equally represented; and another new state called the Republic of Daghestan, under the presidency of a Lesghian of the Mohammedan faith, also emerged. The Cossacks, however, remained aloof.

(3) Educational

Public education was in the hands of the State, or was directly controlled by it. The number of persons able to read or write in the Caucasus in 1912 was only 17 per cent., and the percentage of schools to the population was very low. Some progress was made in the provision of instruction during 1912 and 1913, but the outbreak of war hindered the completion of the various schemes put forward, in particular by the towns of Anapa, Novorossiisk, Yeisk, Temryuk, Maikop, Grozni, Georgievsk, Pyatigorsk, and Stavropol in

171 Ciscaucasia, and Tiflis and Baku in Transcaucasia. In 1913, 3,665 elementary schools were open, and this number was to be increased to 4,220. Secondary or middle schools, divided into Realgymnasia, Gymnasia, and Progymnasia, were also on the increase. The Province of Kuban had the largest number of secondary schools (27), and the Province of Kars the lowest (2). Schools and institutes for the training of teachers were on the increase, and the Polytechnic Institution in contemplation at Tiflis was to embrace agricultural, chemical, economic, and mechanical sections. £210,512 had been collected for this purpose, of which Baku had contributed £42,105, with the petition that a mining section should be added. The Board of Education in 1913 granted permits for 57 new private schools, of which about 234 existed. Movable summer schools for the education of the nomad tribes were attempted for the first time in 1913 in the Governments of Erivan and Kutais. The industrial schools included 22 secondary and lower-grade technical schools, 5 trade schools, 14 lower-grade trade schools, and 3 charitable trade schools.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

181 For nearly a century this region, inhabited by small nationalities of pronounced racial feelings and varied religions, has been welded together by the constraining force of a single dominant power.

The Mohammedan hill-tribes, conquered by superior force, unprogressive, brave, and violent by nature, valued their lost independence more than the peace which Russia's strong hand and impartial justice secured. The Christians, on the other hand, at first grateful for the protection afforded them, began, with increased education and a higher standard of living, to resent the effects of autocratic government and the cramping economic conditions.

The disturbances of 1902–5, though they were

5: Allen H-4 (no date) 1923 RH1 Caucasia RH1

had the right to change masters, and who were protected against arbitrary sale; and the slaves, who were for the most part prisoners of war. Very definite laws regulated the rights and duties of the various castes, and intermarriage was forbidden. On the other hand the princes[1] exercised little real authority; leadership in war was not an hereditary right, but leaders were elected from the families of the princes and nobles by a popular assembly of the four highest classes; while judges were nominated by popular vote, with powers only for a single day.

The social organisation of the Cherkesses was in many respects anarchical, for not only was every tribe independent, but every noble's household within each tribe. Nevertheless the general conduct of the people was subject to a series of established customs, based on primitive conceptions of chivalry, respect for age, hospitality and blood-vengeance. The sons of nobles were educated in a long and difficult course of knightly training by cadet members of other noble families, who stood in the joint relation to them of tutor and blood-brother. The women had few rights, but the rights of protection by their fathers and husbands were very clearly defined.

The eastern tribes occupied the country between the Daryal and the Caspian littoral, and from the right bank of the Terek to the hills overlooking the valleys of the Alazan and the Kur. On the north, inhabiting the highlands of the Terek, the Sunja and the Argun, were the various tribes of Chechens, and the lesser related tribes of the Ingushes, the Kists, the Itskheris and the Galgais. Segregated in unapproachable villages (*auls*) in the depths of primæval beech-forests, the Chechens had a culture which was far less developed than that of the Cherkesses. They had no class system, and lived together in small anarchical communities.

South-east of the Chechens were the powerful Lesghian tribes, scattered over Daghestan ("The Mountain Country"), which formed an elevated table-land through which innumerable rivers had cut channels to a depth frequently of thousands of feet, the whole being backed and ribbed south and west by mountain chains with several peaks over 13,000 feet in height. The principal Lesghian tribes were the Kubachins and Darghis on the north-east, bordering the Chechen country, the Kazi-Kumukhs of the central plateau, the Kurins and Tabasserans of the south-east, overlooking the Tatar lowlands of Shirvan, and the Avars, Andis and Didos on the west, bordering on Kakhetia.

1 [of the Cherkess--Analyst]

7:Columbia U. S-4, 5 1956 RH1 Caucasia RH1
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EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES

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As everywhere, education in the Caucasus aimed at developing those traits in the children which were part of the national cultural ideal. In the whole N. Caucasus and in Georgia, great stress was laid on the development of character (courage, stamina, loyalty, modesty, but also self-assertion and vengefullness) and on good manners (especially in the N. W. Caucasus there was a complex and rigid code of behavior). The education consisted further in instruction in the use of arms and in horsemanship. Among the mountaineers it had definite Spartan characteristics, e. g. the Khevsur put burning wicks or glowing coals on the hands of their children to harden them against pain and to test their stamina. Stress was also laid on the ability to express oneself well and to the point, and to make speeches at various occasions. In Georgia, among the higher classes, there was a native tradition of training in the arts and sciences, the centers of which originally were the monasteries. In the N. Caucasus such a tradition did not exist, though there were Moslem schools (medrese) giving instruction in religion and some arithmetic, and also Russian schools, founded after the subjugation. Before the revolution, the higher classes sent their children to Russian cultural centers to complete their education. Many chose a

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military career, as the qualities required there were most in conformity with the ideals handed down by native tradition.

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Among the higher classes in the N. W. Caucasus, the usage was to have their children brought up in a family of a lower class; this custom also existed among Western Georgian nobles in imitation of Circassian usage. Even before the birth of the child the aspirants vied with each other for the honor of being its atalyk (foster parent). The atalyk acquired all the rights of blood relationship; the ward upon completion of his education was naturally more attached to his foster parents than to his own, and could be counted on to avenge any harm done to his educators.

8: Lužbetak E-4 (no date) 1951 RH1 Caucasia RH1

indeed love my mother; but I must also punish the person who suggested surrender. Take my mother therefore, and punish her, punish her with one stroke and give me the remaining 39." This is a story every North Caucasian Mohammedan has heard again and again.

§ 7. EDUCATION

With the coming of Mohammedanism the method of education in the Caucasus was revolutionized. In many places throughout North Caucasus and especially in Daghestan, a new educator was introduced, the mullah. Till then, the *home* was the only "school" and the parents (or foster-parents) the only educators.[80] The subject matter of these Mohammedan schools[81] was, as usual, limited to the study of Arabic and the Koran and Islamic tradition, at times taught by very poorly educated mullahs.[82]

The second important innovation came with the Russians,[83] but especially with the Soviets. Only the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijani had an alphabet in pre-Soviet times.[84] The Soviets immediately realized the necessity of an alphabet for each language, without which the spread of Marxism would be impossible. In 1928 about 40 per cent of the Chechens received formal schooling, while only a very few isolated mountain villages had no school at all.[85] In the mountain of Daghestan the illiteracy is still very great. According to statistics of 1926 only about 10 per cent of the men and 1 per cent of the women can read. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that progress has been made among these mountain peoples too.[86] Today there are enough Lesghians who are able to read to make Russian, Kumykian, Lak, and Avarian newspapers possible.[87] The Lesghian children receive instructions in their mother-tongue only in the first two years at school; after that they must learn either Kumykian or Russian. In secondary schools both languages are obligatory.[88]

As for home education, a few general remarks will suffice. The education of little children and of all unmarried girls is the task of the mother; the education of the boys is the task of the father.[89] The little children are told to behave

[80] Cf. K. N. Rossikov, "Poězdka v Čečnju i Nagornyj Dagestan," ZKO, XIII (1884), p. 249.

[81] A. Zacharov, "Narodnoe obučenie u Zakavkazskich Tatar," SMOMPK, IX (1890), No. 2, pp. 7—51; Mir-Galim-bek Vezirov, "O Tatarskich Školach," SMOMPK, IX (1890), No. 2, pp. 1—6; A. Omarov, "Vospominanija mutaallima," SSKG, I, pp. 13—20; II, pp. 46—70.

[82] Cf. Halil Beg Munsayassul for a description of his schooling in *Das Land der letzten Ritter*, pp. 52—56.

[83] "O rasprostranenii gramotnosti meždu gorcami," SSKG, III (1870), pp. 1—30. The main object of pre-Soviet education was to teach a sufficient number of natives the Russian language.

[84] Of course some attempts had been made before the Revolution. Fifteen years after the Revolution all North Caucasians had a written language. The Latin script was used as foundation for the Cherkess, Abaz, Chechen, Karachai, Balkarian, Avar, Dargwa, Kurin, Lak, Tabassaran, Kumykian, Nogai, and Tat languages. Cf. G. P. Serdjučenko, "Jazyki Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana," *Sbornik lingvističeskich issledovanij*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, p. 7.

[85] Plätschke, *Die Tschetschenen*, p. vii.

[86] R. Kherumian, "Contribution à l'Anthropologie du Caucase," *L'Anthropologie*, LII (1948), No. 1—2, p. 44.

[87] Nansen, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

[88] *ibid.*

[89] Ladyženskij, FT, p. 200.

8: Lužbetak E-4 (no date) 1951 RHl Caucasia RHl

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Speaking of Russian influence, we must emphasize that nothing tends to unify the marriage and family observances among the mountaineers as much as formal education, formal Russian, and especially Soviet education (*supra*, p. 147).

Russian influence and the consequent change in customary marriage and family law (and we may include changes in Islamic law) are most strongly felt near and in large Russian cities like Grozny, along the coast of the Black and Caspian Sea, and, in general, wherever industrialization is making great strides. It is more strongly felt in the lowlands, less in the highlands, and only slightly in isolated villages.

2. Islamic Influence

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Going somewhat deeper into history, we find a second principle, changing and unifying the customary law of the various mountain peoples of Caucasia, Islamic law, known as the *šarî'a*.

(1) A number of *marriage impediments*, e. g., the "waiting period," the impediment of relationship by milk, etc. have either been introduced by Mohammedan missionaries or, at least, greatly modified by Islamic law (pp. 55, 66, 69).

(2) We have observed in not a few instances a conflict between the native *adats* and the *šarî'a*, e. g., the struggle between *obligatory levirate* and Islamic optional levirate (*supra*, p. 73).

(3) Non-virgins are sometimes given *freedom of choice* in mating (*supra*, pp. 78 f), while virgins are not, a practice in full accord with the teaching of the Šâfi'itic School.

(4) Thanks to Islamic influence, genuine *bride price* has throughout North Caucasus tended to become a form of dowry, called *kebin* (*supra*, p. 90).

(5) Penalties for *abduction* (*supra*, pp. 92—96),

(6) *the strict separation of sexes* (*supra*, pp. 106 f, 166),

(7) some *birth* customs, such as, naming of children, etc. (*supra*, pp. 142 f),

(8) some *engagement observances* (*supra*, pp. 100—110),

(9) some *divorce* laws (*supra*, pp. 133—137),

(10) *husband-wife relations* (*supra*, pp. 152—156),

(11) *parent-child relations* (*supra*, pp. 138—149, 187),

(12) certain *penal laws* for sexual offenses (*supra*, p. 171),

(13) *slavery* (*supra*, p. 65),

(14) and the general improvement in the *relative position of sexes*, e. g., acquisition of inheritance rights in Kabardia and Ossetia,[1] the *kebin*, and others—

all have been greatly modified by Islamic law. The *šarî'a* is doubtless one of the main unifyng principles in the marriage and family laws of the Caucasians.

However, the strength of this influence and the opposition against it have not been the same everywhere. Islamism has had very little influence on the marriage and family of the Southern Caucasians, except, of course, in Sakataly

[1] Ladyženskij, "Zur Erforschung der Rechtsgewohnheiten der Bergvölker des Kaukasus," *Zeitsch. f. Ethnologie*, XLII (1930), p. 241.

1 [Sic — Analyst]

Chechens. They at first accepted the leadership of the Sheikh Uzun Hadji who proclaimed himself Imam and Emir of the Northern Caucasus. The Emir was the ally of the communists in the struggle against the White Guards of General Denikin. Having vanquished the White armies, the Bolsheviks dropped the Imam, but they were unable to cope with Chechen nationalism. The Chechens demanded the expulsion of all Russians who in the course of the last century had settled in their 'living space'. Pending a positive answer to this request Chechen nationalist bands terrorized the Russian population of the area beyond endurance. In the early twenties the Russian settlers in Chechenia sent a complaint to Moscow on account of the endless raids and murders perpetrated by Chechen bands, and petitioned that they be disarmed. Mikhail Kalinin went personally to the Caucasus and attempted to calm down both Russians and Chechens. With carefully chosen words he tried to persuade them to live together in peace, to intermarry and to respect each other's customs.[6] 669

Whilst in consequence of Kalinin's personal intervention banditry stopped in Chechenia, it would seem that Moslem opposition to the Soviet régime was never quite suppressed. In 1931 the little country still had 2,675 mosques and Arab schools, as well as 1,250 mullahs, 34 sheikhs and 250 religious elders. The mullahs who were powerful opponents of the Soviet régime even managed to keep alive the illegal Shariah courts which were camouflaged as 'reconciliation commissions'. [692] 668

The hostile attitude of the Chechens towards the Soviet Russian régime was often manifested in the readiness to credit the most fantastic anti-Russian rumours. Thus, in the early thirties, there existed a widespread belief that Kunta Hadji – the head of a popular Moslem sect who had died at the end of the nineteenth century – was still alive and was soon to return to Chechenia, where he would found a State based on Moslem religious law. Apparently the Chechens did not differentiate between Czarist and Bolshevik Russia in their hopes that Kunta Hadji would appear as Messiah, for it was he who had led them in the risings against Czarism in 1864 and 1877, for which he was exiled to Novgorod. [795]

The Ingush, whose fate Soviet policy had coupled with that of the Chechens, showed themselves no less loyal to Islam. A delegate who represented Ingushetia at the 'Second All-Union Conference of Godless Pedagogists' in 1931, stated that the influence of the Moslem clergy was still so strong among the Ingush that children refused to learn from books which they believed to be anti-religious. Whenever a teacher tried to introduce anti-religious propaganda he encountered a hostile attitude among school children and there were cases in which teachers had even to leave the school for having criticized Islam. The work of the secular Soviet schools, where the children were taught in the winter, was counteracted by the Moslem schools where the young Ingush would learn 771 871

Ca 771 during the summer holidays all that the Soviet authorities wished them
● [370] to disregard. A number of Ingush party and Communist Youth League members, instead of working against the influence of religion, used themselves to go to the mosques to pray.[1]

Ca 447 191 The difficulties existing between the Soviet authorities and the Chechens and Ingush were not exclusively due to the Bolshevik failure to understand the importance of the religious factor in the life of the mountaineers. There were also extraordinary difficulties of a technical nature, due to the fact that the directives of the central administration were issued in the Russian language and therefore did not reach the Chechen-Ingush masses. Being unable fully to understand the orders received, the local Soviet organs either could not carry them out, or falsified the decisions of the party and of the administration.[2]

GROZNY – THE OIL CITY

Ca 178 It was the tremendous dead weight of the predominantly Russian capital of Chechenia that prevented the implementation of any genuine Chechen autonomy and finally spelled the doom of the Chechen people. The actual liquidation of the Chechens would probably not have occurred had not the largest town in their homeland become an oil city, and indeed, one of the most important oil centres of the U.S.S.R.

Ca 915 SU 315 This oil city had developed out of the little fortress of Grozny. Although Grozny oilfields had been discovered as early as 1833, they were hardly exploited at all in the nineteenth century. In 1912, however, they already supplied 11·5 per cent of the entire Russian oil. Between 1913 and 1917 this figure had risen to 16·7 per cent, and in the following four years to nearly 25 per cent. By 1937 the proportion of Grozny oil to total Russian oil production had fallen to 9·25 per cent, but in terms of absolute figures this output represented an increase of 234 per cent, compared to that before the First World War. The development of Grozny as an oil centre made for an increase of the population on an 'American scale'. In 1890 the place had no more than 6,000 inhabitants, against 34,067 in 1913, 97,095 in 1926 and 172,468 in 1939. It need hardly be added that the Chechens and Ingush, peoples consisting of shepherds and peasants, could not contribute anything worth mentioning to the rise of the town which was styled, almost ironically, 'Capital of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.'. Among the oilworkers of Grozny there were probably at no time more than one-tenth of 'natives', and until 1936 there were but 9·7 per cent.

Ca 361 162

Ca 177 S.U. 583 Unlike so many cities in the Soviet Union, Grozny never changed its name under the Soviet régime, despite the imperialistic history connected with it. As a matter of fact, it was the Soviet oil city of Grozny which spelled the doom of the Chechens and not the little fortress which

1 [Cf. category 116, pp. 186-188, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz – Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, p. 186, R1 188 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz – Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Kabardin] Caucasia RH 1

S.U. 563 634 687 achieved a dual purpose. In addition to punishing the Balkars it served as a warning for the Kabardinians, who from then on hastened to express their loyalty towards Soviet Russia in a very demonstrative, even effusive, way.

Ca. 177.8 814 S.U. 563 814 After the war the Soviet authorities found it advisable to provide for the Kabardinians, as a means of strengthening their allegiance to the Soviet State, a clear conception of history which would unequivocally show that the Russians had always been the protectors of the Kabardinian people. The task of formulating the details of this conception was assigned to the 'Kabardinian Research Institute', whose headquarters are in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The new conception implied the 'official recognition' of Temryuk Idarovich as the national hero of Kabarda. Kabardinian children are expected to look up to Temryuk with the same awe as Russian boys and girls to Peter the Great or Suvorov. According to the new official thesis Temryuk, a Kabardinian prince who lived around 1550, 'endeavoured to build up a strong centralized State able to resist Turkish and Crimean Tartar oppressors'. Temryuk had realized that the Kabardinians were incapable of withstanding their enemies if they were to rely on their own forces only; establishment of close contacts with Muscovy was therefore the only wise Kabardinian policy.[15]

It is the same story which is told with some variation to all the peoples of the Soviet Union in all their many languages. There is always a grain of truth in the story, but never the entire truth, since history is not so simple and so clear-cut that it would fit the purposes of a one-sided propaganda. It is a historical fact that Temryuk asked Ivan the Terrible for protection and even gave him his daughter for wife. Originally, in the days of greater internationalism, Soviet historians failed to stress this fact, and laid more emphasis on the slave trade in which the Kabardinian feudal lords had engaged with the Crimean Tartar Khanate. However, since events had proved the necessity of increasing the attachment and loyalty of the Kabardinians to the Russians and the Soviet State, Temryuk had to be brought to the forefront of Kabardinian history.

Ca. 177.53 538 Kabardinian post-war literature also pursued the aim of re-educating the Kabardinian people. The central theme of the first Kabardinian literary almanac consisted in showing that it was 'the friendship with the Russian people that led the Kabardinians towards a better life.'[16]

Ca. 871 191 While a great deal was done for 're-education' in the sense required by the Russians, education as such had been neglected during the first post-war years, at least as far as the Kabardinian language was concerned. The so-called 'national' schools in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. were Kabardinian in the first four forms only; from the fifth form onwards teaching was in the Russian language exclusively. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party issued in 1948 a state-

ment on 'serious shortcomings and mistakes' committed in Kabarda in the field of national policy. It stressed that conditions in Kabardinian education were in conflict with the constitution of the A.S.S.R., which stipulated the right of the Kabardinian people to schools in their own language.

Although the Kabardinians are by far more numerous and advanced than the peoples of the Soviet Far North, they suffer from the same acute shortage of national teaching-personnel which has been fatal to the national culture of many a minor Soviet nationality. Thus in 1948, the Kabardinian teachers' training college at Nalchik had but fifty-six Kabardinians out of a total of 559 students.[17]

It is to be expected that the survival of a truly Kabardinian culture and Kabardinian language will become even more remote with the increasing pressure of Slav colonization. Between 1926 and 1935 alone the number of Russians and Ukrainians in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. more than doubled; it increased from about 37,000 to 93,000. This increase was partly due to immigration, partly to the inclusion in Kabarda of a number of Cossack villages in 1932. After the war the numerical relation between 'natives' and colonists changed to the detriment of the former, owing to the forcible departure of the Balkars. Moreover more Russian colonists came into the country to staff new factories springing up around Nalchik.

[Cf. category 631, p. 83 - - Analyst]

THE CIRCASSIANS – A RESERVE OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

For the benefit of the remnants of the Circassian people, the Soviet Government set up two Autonomous Provinces in the western part of the North Caucasus area; the Cherkess Province in the Caucasus foothills and the Adyge Province in the Kuban plain.

Surrounded as they are on all sides by Russian territories these two national units have little chance of long-term survival. This applies in particular to the Adyge Province, whose capital – Maikop – used to be the third largest Russian oil centre after Baku and Grozny, before the development of the 'second Baku' between the Volga and the Urals.

Originally, Maikop was not included in the Adyge Province, which had a small Adyge majority in its initial stage (55·7 per cent various branches of Adyge, 42·7 per cent Russians and Ukrainians, and the rest made up of other Europeans and Armenians). The size of the Province was increased, however, before the war and the Adyge thus found themselves in the position of a minority. In 1930 the Adyge Province won doubtful 'fame' owing to its extraordinarily high percentage of disfranchized people. This was due to the arbitrary action of the local Soviet authorities, who had indiscriminately interpreted the terms of 'kulak', 'capitalist' and 'reactionary' with the result that 12 per cent of the entire adult population of the Province were deprived of their civic rights. — [Cf. [illegible] p. 182, R1 Soviet Union-Analyst]